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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the fall of 2005, ordinary citizens and political
leaders in Iraq, the United States, and elsewhere debated complex issues of institutional design in the process of adopting
the Iraqi Constitution. Little-noticed in the discussions, however, was a seemingly minor change in the rights provisions
applicable to Iraqi citizens. Whereas Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law had guaranteed Iraqis a wide array of rights
in international law, including customary international law
(CIL),' the Constitution as adopted only guaranteed rights in
treaties endorsed by Iraq and not in conflict with the principles of the Constitution.2 The new Constitution thus changed

the relationship between the domestic order and the international legal order, moving away from a broadly internationalist
model toward one in which national consent was key to obligation. Presumably, Iraqi citizens no longer can rely on customary international law as a direct source of rights and duties to
be enforced in Iraqi courts.
The Iraqi case prompts general questions about constitutional design and international law: Under what circumstances will constitution-drafters allow customary international
law to be directly binding in the domestic legal order? Should
treaty-making be a relatively simple process, requiring assent
by one or two constitutional actors, or more complex, involving multiple actors, supermajorities, and public involvement
before external commitment can be effected? These ques1. The text guarantees Iraqis "the rights stipulated in international treaties and agreements, other instruments of international law that Iraq has
signed and to which it has acceded, and others that are deemed binding
upon it, and in the law of nations." LAw OF ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE
OF IRAQ FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD art. 23, available at http://www.cpairaq.org/government/TAL.html [hereinafter Transitional Administrative

Law].
2. IRAQ CONST. art. 44 (2005).
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tions of constitutional design may be linked. Some states, for
example, make customary international law directly binding
but have difficult processes of treaty enactment that result in
3
agreements of lower legal status than domestic law. Others
may make treaties directly applicable and superior to statutes,
but refuse to give customary international law direct effect in
the legal system. 4 Why would states differ along these dimensions?
These questions implicate the intersection of recently burgeoning scholarship in the fields of comparative constitutional
5
law and institutional design, international law, and interna6 Surprisingly, none of these bodies of literational relations.
ture has yet addressed the question of why states open their
7
domestic order to international law, and there is no real posi3. Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law]
Dec. 20, 1993, as amended, chs. 2, 5, arts. 25, 59.
4. See, e.g., CONsTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE EL SALVADOR, art. 144
(1983); 1958 Const. 55.
5. DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 22-29
(Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002). See also NoRMAN DORSEN ET
AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003);

VICKI

C.

JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (Foundation
Press 1999); FRANCOIS VENTER, CONSTITUTIONAL COMPARISON: JAPAN, GERMANY, CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA AS CONSTITUTIONAL STATES

D.

COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION

PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
CENTIVES, AND OUTCOMES

(2000);

(2000);

ROBERT

GIOVANNI SARTORI, COM-

ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO STRUCTURES, INDENNIS MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DE-

195 (1997);

(1996).
6. Kenneth W. Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International
Law and Policy, 1 J. INr'L L. & INT'L REL. 9 (2005). See generally Anne-Marie

MOCRACY

Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S.
Tulumello & Stepan Wood, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Themy: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367
(1998); Judith 0. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane & Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Preface: Legalization and World Politics, 54.INT'L ORG. 385 (2000);
Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in Handbook of International Relations 538, 538-40 (W.
Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
7. One exception from a constitutional theory perspective is Mattias
Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Status of International Law:
Towards an Integrative Constitutional Theory of Natural and International
Law (paper on file with author). See also Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of
InternationalLaw: A ConstitutionalistFramework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L.
907 (2004);John K. Setear, Treaty, Custom, Iteration and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J.
INT'L

L. 715 (2005).
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tive theory in these areas. 8 A vast literature concerns the effects of international law on domestic governance. 9 A smaller
literature concerns the effects of domestic institutions on international cooperation. 10 This Article seeks to tackle both
problems in a unified framework treating international commitment as a function of domestic constitutional design.
I approach the problem from the perspective of positive
constitutional theory that sees constitutions as precommitment devices. Constitutions represent self-binding acts,
whereby drafters restrict the actions available to future politicians." By constraining choices to be made at a later time,
constitutions can help to resolve current political problems
and thereby facilitate stable political order in the future. I focus specifically on the precommitment functions of international law provisions, noting that they are distinct from other
forms of constitutional precommitment in that they offer a
means of placing policies beyond the control of any domestic
8. See, e.g., LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 51
(5th ed. 1998) (noting that "It] he whole subject resists generalization. .. ");
see also John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 313-15 (1992) (noting that linguistic and
interpretive factors may discourage direct application of international
norms); Terence Daintith, Is InternationalLaw the Enemy of National Democracy?, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 115, 115-16 (Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme
&Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001) ("[C]omparative measurement [is] an
impossible task").
9. Nancy Boswell, The Impact of InternationalLaw on Domestic Governance,
97 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 133 (2003); Saskia Sassen, The State & Economic
Globalization: Any Implications for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 109
(2000); Robert Keohane & Lisa Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,
20 INT'L SECURITY 39 (1995); INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
(Robert Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996).
10. See HELEN MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION

(1997). See generally LOCATING THE
DOMESTIC AND

INTERNATIONAL

PROPER AUTHORITIES: THE INTERACTION OF

INSTITUTIONS

(Daniel Drezner ed., 2002);

DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLIT-

IcS (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993); Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 451 (1988); LISA L.
MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS

11.

(2000).

JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND

IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox

of Democracy, in

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND

Slagstad eds., 1988);

DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune

STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE
THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134-77 (1995).
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actor. Under some circumstances, this feature of international
law provisions may make the resulting commitments more effective. I then examine the particular functions of customary
international law and treaty provisions as precommitment devices. This perspective helps to illuminate several puzzles in
the domestic constitutional treatment of international law, including why it is that states treat custom and treaties differently, and why certain kinds of states are more likely to make
international law directly binding in the domestic legal order.
Before proceeding, I should make clear that my emphasis
throughout is on the domestic functions of international law.
International law scholars have devoted some recent attention
12
With only a
to the design of international agreements.
couple of exceptions, the conventional approach to treaty design follows the assumption of realism in international relations theory, treating states as unitary actors and focusing only
on their interactions with each other, without considering any
internal dynamics. This concept of the state as a unitary actor
13
But it is clearly less accuis no doubt easier for modeling.
rate. This Article follows the two recent contributions of Raustiala and Brewster, who have begun to develop a framework
law. 14
for understanding the domestic bases of international
This move is methodologically consistent with1 5the broader
"liberal" school of international law scholarship.
12. See Andrew Guzman, The Design of InternationalAgreements, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 612 (2005); Andrew Guzman, The Cost of Credibility:Explaining Resistance to InterstateDispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002).
See generally Kal Raustiala, Form & Substance in InternationalAgreements, AM. J.
INT'L L. 581 (2005).
13. Eric Posner, InternationalLaw and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FL. ST. U.
L. REv. (2005); PeterJ. Spiro, DisaggregatingU.S. Interests in InternationalLaw,
67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 204 (2004).
14. Raustiala, supra note 12; Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501 (2004). Raustiala and Brewster
both focus on the domestic origins of international agreements: Raustiala
focuses on the impact of domestic groups on the form and substance of
international agreement, while Brewster's emphasis is on the institutional
allocation of powers in the domestic constitutional order.
15. Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 205, 206-07 (1993); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92
AM. J. INT'L L 367 (1998); Andrew Moravscik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A
Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997).
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Once we "unpack" the state, we can see that differences in
regime types and structures may affect the constitutional treatment of international law. International law, I argue, is a particularly useful device for certain kinds of states, namely those
that are undergoing a transition to democracy. By bonding
the government's behavior to international standards and raising the price of deviation, international law commitments in
the constitution may help to "lock in" democracy domestically
by giving important interest groups more confidence in the
regime. On the international plane, new democracies may
lack credibility in terms of the ability to deliver on their
promises, and more sophisticated provisions for international
legal obligation can help to communicate to foreign partners
the widespread domestic support for international agreements. For both international and domestic audiences, international law helps to resolve commitment problems for new
democracies that may not be as urgent for established democracies or continuing autocracies.
In the end, my evidence suggests that new democracies
tend to be more open to customary international law, and to
provide for treaty-making structures that build on the logic of
precommitment. This finding demonstrates that international
legal commitments have both domestic and international audiences. It also suggests that the scope of international law itself
may be determined by domestic constitutional structures, an
argument whose implications are explored in the concluding
section.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the
topic by describing the concepts of monism and dualism,
which have become conventional ways for international lawyers to speak about the interaction of the domestic and international legal systems. Part III sets out the theory of commitments and explains the relative advantages (and disadvantages) of international law, both customary and that embodied
in international agreements. Part IV develops and preliminarily tests some empirical implications. Part V concludes.
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II.

MONISM, DUALISM AND THE. INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS

Status of InternationalLaw in the Domestic Order
National constitutional provisions vary widely in terms of
their relationship with international law. International lawyers
have traditionally used the concept of monism and dualism to
describe the relationship between international legal order
16 Briefly, monists see internaand the domestic legal order.
tional law and the domestic legal system as part of the same
A.

legal order.1 7 International law has a primary place in this uni-

tary legal system, so that domestic legal systems .must always
conform to the requirements of international law or find

themselves in violation. This would be true whether or not
domestic legal actors had actively transformed international legal norms into domestic norms in accordance with domestic

constitutional rules.
In contrast, dualists view the international legal order as
distinct, only penetrating the domestic legal order by explicit
consent of the state involved. When the two systems conflict,
municipal courts would apply municipal law. This view was especially important in the era of positivism, which viewed the
nation-state as the sole unit of political authority and source of
legal obligation. From a dualist perspective, the international
legal order could purport to bind actors within states but required consent to do so as a matter of domestic law. International legal obligations would require transposition into the
domestic order to take effect. 8 Absent such transposition,
there is the distinct possibility of an action being legal in municipal law but illegal in international law, in which case a dualist would presume that municipal courts should apply municipal law. 19
16. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 213-17 (2d ed. 2005); BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 31-33; Jackson, supra note 8, at 310-15; see also Daintith,
supra note 8.
17. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 64 (1995).
Cassese notes another early view of monism that had domestic law as the
primary in the relationship. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 213-14.
18. See Eyal Benvenisti, JudicialMisgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts, 4 EuR. J. INT'L L. 159,
160 (1993).
19. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32. The high point of monist thinking is

found in the PCIJ opinion in Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations,
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A further complexity is that monism and dualism can vary
with the type of obligation, meaning that a state can be monist
with regard to treaty law but dualist with regard to customary
international law. For example, the Netherlands Constitution
of 1983 places international treaties above the Constitution,
and explicitly states that statutes that conflict with international law are void. 20 But the Dutch Constitution does not give
the same status to customary international law.21 In Germany,

Italy and Austria, by contrast, customary international law is
superior to domestic statutes, but treaties are equal to domestic statues, with the last in time rule determining which is
valid. 22 This is the opposite of the Dutch Constitution. To take
another example, the Constitution of Russia states that the
"universally recognized principles and norms of international
law as well as international agreements of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal system. If an international
agreement of the Russian Federation establishes rules which
differ from those stipulated by law, then the rules of international agreement shall apply." 23 France has yet another configuration, in which treaties have higher status than subse-

Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.IJ. (ser. B) No. 10 (Feb. 21). This opinion asserts that states have a duty to modify national law so as to conform to the
requirements of international law. Id. at 20.
20. GRONDWET [Constitution] art. 91.3 (Neth.) (providing for approval
of treaties that conflict with the constitution by 2/3 vote); Art. 94 (statutes
in conflict with treaties are inapplicable). See CASSESE, supra note 16, at 229
n.30 (providing an explanation). Jackson, supra note 8, at 334 n.122 argues
that Dutch Courts have been reluctant to find any treaties truly supreme
over the constitution. One also wonders whether a constitutional amendment purporting to escape treaty commitments would be deemed unconstitutional under this scheme. Id. at 332-33.
21. SeeJonkheer H. F. van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and Internacional Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 537, 557 (1953); see also Benvenisti, supra
note 18, at 162.
22. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 230.
23. CONST. OF RusstA art. 15(4). An interesting variant is found in Article
11 of the 1992 Slovak Constitution, stating that "International treaties on
human rights and basic liberties that were ratified by the Slovak Republic
and promulgated in a manner determined by law take precedence over its
own laws, provided that they secure a greater extent of constitutional rights
and liberties." For a discussion, see Vladlen S. Vereschetin, New Constitutions
and the Old Problem of the Relationship Between InternationalLaw and National
Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 29 (1996).
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quent legislation. 24 The French Constitution is silent on customary international law, however.
With a long tradition of parliamentary supremacy, the
United Kingdom would seem to be the paradigmatic dualist
state. 25 Parliamentary sovereignty was famously defined by Dicey as "the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and
further, that no person or body is recognized by the law of
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament." 26 This would presumably include international bodies. Parliament is also free to pass statutes that con27
flict with prior treaties.

At the same time, customary international law was traditionally viewed as part of the common law, and as directly applicable so long as not overruled by subsequent statute orjudicial decision. 28 This is called the doctrine of incorporation,
whereby changes in CIL are automatically "incorporated" into
the common law. 29 Since the 1870s, some have asserted that

the UK has followed the competing doctrine of transformation, such that evidence of some governmental intent to incorporate the international rule into domestic law is required; but

24. CASSESE, supra note 16, at 228; HENKIN, supra note 17, at 73; Dominique Remy-Granger, The Ambiguities of the State Based on the Rule of Law: A
Unitary System d la Franfaise, in AMBIGUITY IN THE RULE OF LAW: THE INTERFACE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 53, 53-62
(Thomas A.J.A. Vandamme & Jan-Herman Reestman eds., 2001).
25. Jackson, supra note 8, at 313-15.
26. ALBERT V. DIcEY, THE LAW OF THE CONsTITUrTiON 37-38 (8th ed.
1923).
27. See Ian Ward, The Best of All Possible Worlds? Maastricht and the United
Kingdom, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 75, 85-86 (1994).
28. BROWNLIE, supranote 8, at 42-43. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas D. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds.,
1996); Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as

Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815,
822 (1997) (discussing U.S. jurisprudence); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1824, 1825-26 (1998); Gerald

L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response
to ProfessorsBradley and Goldsmith, 66

FORDHAM

L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997);

Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw and Human Rights Treaties Are Law
of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999).
29. Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, (1977) Q.B. 529,

553-54.
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the conventional view is that the doctrine of incorporation remains intact.

30

The U.S. Constitution establishes a scheme somewhat similar to that of the U.K. 31 Customary international law, or the
"law of nations," was traditionally viewed as part of federal
common law. 32 Article I section 8 of the Constitution also
gives Congress the power to "define the law of nations. '3 3 This
provision would seem to give the legislative branch primary
control over the treatment of custom, but legislation is seldom
based on this provision.3 4 Treaties are the "Supreme Law of
the Land" according to the supremacy clause, although later
in time statutes can supersede them.3 5 Thus Congress and the
President can together supersede a Treaty adopted by the
President and Senate alone. In addition, the doctrine of selfexecuting treaties governs which treaties require legislation to
take effect.

36

These examples illustrate the great variety of ways in
which states treat international law vis-A-vis domestic obligations. There is no necessary relationship between the treatment of customary international law and treaty law, nor any
of the manner in
general convergence among states in terms
37
which they treat international obligations.
30. BROWNLIE,

supra note 8, at 43-46 (discussing caselaw); Trendtex Trad-

ing Corp. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, (1977) Q.B. 529, 553-54.
31. Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, OurDualist Constitution,and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REv. 529, 530-31 (1999).
32. See the debate following Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 28, at 822;
Koh, supra note 28, at 1825-26; Neuman, supra note 28, at 372; Paust, supra
note 28, at 301.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
34. The sole exception may be the Alien Tort Claims Act, Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000)); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 210 (2d ed. 1996) (noting the power "has been little used, and its purport has not been wholly clear"); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power To "Define And Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 523 (2000).
35. Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rulefor Treaties and FederalStatutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 334 (2005); HENKIN, supra note 34, at
211-12.

36.

GEOFFREY

R.

STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

332 (2005).

37. Cf Duncan Hollis, A ComparativeApproach to Treaty Law and Practice,in
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 1, 8 (D. Hollis, M. R. Blakeslee & L. B.
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B.

Ease of Obligation

Constitutions also vary widely in the ease with which they
allow international obligations to be made by governments.
Most readers will be familiar with the United States' process
for making treaties, which involves Senate advice and consent
to treaties "made" by the Executive. 3

American practice has

also developed Congressional-Executive agreements as a mode
of international agreement. 39 Furthermore, since Missouri v.
Holland,40 the treaty process can be used to evade constraints
of federalism. 4 1 This shift empowered the national government relative to the states. Thus, in the United States, treatymaking empowers the executive relative to Congress and empowers the national government relative to subnational units,
when compared with normal legislative processes.
In other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, treaty making
may be accomplished solely by the executive without legislative
approval. 4 2 At the other extreme, some countries require the
constitutional court to give assent to treaties before they take
Ederington eds., 2005) (finding "states show surprisingly similar approaches" to treaty practice).
38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. See HENKIN, supra note 34, at 215-19; John K. Setear, The President's
Rational Choice of a Treaty's PreratificationPathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement., 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 5 (2002); see also
Brewster, supra note 14, at 514.
40. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding a treaty for migratory bird protection,
which was unconstitutional under commerce clause jurisprudence of the
1920s, legal under the treaty power).
41. See the recent review and critique of the scholarship in Gary Lawson
& Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
42. Basic Law of Government (1993), art. 70 (Saudi Arabia). More commonly, this is the case with treaties on certain subject matters only. For example, under the French Constitution, "important" treaties-including
those involving peace, territory, international organizations, or the status of
persons-do require legislative approval in addition to the standard executive approval. 1958 CONST. 52-53. See also Constitution of Zambia (as
amended by Act No. 18 of 1996) art. 44(2) (d); THE PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF QATAR art. 68; 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 35
(Greece);

1991

OF SENEGAL

Muaritania CONST. art.

78;

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

(2001) art. 95. See generally Luzius WILDHABER,

TREATY-MAKING

POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY

44-45 (1971).
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effect, 43 while many more countries allow treaties to be challenged before the constitutional court if alleged to violate the
constitution. 4 4 A referendum to approve treaties may also be
required or allowed. In Switzerland, for example, any 50,000
citizens can submit a request for a referendum on certain treaties.

45

46
Related to ease of obligation are provisions on exit.

Heifer's recent analysis does an important service by integrating treaty exit with treaty entry. 47 If obligations are easy to escape, they are politically less risky and therefore less costly to
enter into.48 In the United States, for example, the President
can unilaterally end treaty obligations even if they were entered into with Senate advice and consent. 49 The United
States' system is asymmetric in this regard. 50 Other countries
utilize the identical process for treaty enactment as for treaty
43. See CONSTITUTION OF CZECH REPUBLIC arts. 10, 49, 87.2; The Constitution of the Republic of Madagascar, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
WORLD

(Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Oceana Publications 1999).

44. See

CONSTITUTION OF THE GABONESE REPUBLIC (1997) art. 11, translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: REPUBLIC OF GABON, Booklet 1, 6-7 (Daniel G. Anna & Anne-Franooise Bewley trans., Gisbert
H. Flanz ed., 1998). CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA art. 81.2;
100.2; MONGOL ULSYN UNDSEN KHUULI [Constitution] art. 66.2 (Mong.). See
generally Tom Ginsburg, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, in INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAw: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES (Tom Ginsburg & Robert
Kagan eds., 2005).
45. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Erdgenossenschaft [Constitution] art. 141 ("International treaties which: are of unlimited duration and
may not be terminated; provide for the entry into an international organization; involve a multilateral unification of law"); see also art. 166.2 (empower-

ing the parliament to approve certain international treaties); KONSTYrUCJA
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [Constitution] art. 90 (Pol.); Constitution of Albania (1998) art. 125.
46. Laurence R. Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579 (2005).
47. id.
48. They are also, therefore, less valuable as commitments, as will be seen
in the next section.
49. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Note that another route
for treaty "exit" in the United States is the possibility of enacting subsequent
legislation that supersedes the earlier treaty. This allows an ordinary majority in both houses, with presidential assent, to over-rule an earlier commitment by a president and 2/3 of the Senate.
50. SeeJohn McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A
Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REv. 385 (2003) (arguing that
with regard to legislation, the enactment .rule of an entrenched provision
should be the same as repeal rule). Cf Eric Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Leg-
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revocation. But most constitutions are silent on the issue of
51
treaty exit.

It is possible to measure the degree of difficulty of treaty
making and exit in different constitutional systems. Ideally
one should pay attention to at least four dimensions. 52 These
include the number of actors and voting rules to enact a
treaty; the ease of over-riding or exiting treaties as a matter of
domestic law; the symmetry between entry and exit; and the
relationship of treaties to domestic statutes, including the relative difficulty of enacting each. In the empirical examination
at the end of this paper, I focus primarily on ease of entry.
C. Domestic Constitutional Configurations
To summarize, every constitutional system has a particular
configuration in terms of how it treats international obligation. We have established that constitutional provisions on international cooperation vary widely among nations. 53 The tables below array some of the possible choices. For both CIL
and treaties, we ask about the domestic status of international
law, and then we provide an ideal-type internationalist position, nationalist position, and an intermediate one. We then
show how four representative countries deal with the various
choices. The United States is relatively nationalist with regard
to its treatment of both custom and treaty, but other countries
can approach these two forms of international law differently.
Germany is internationalist toward custom but relatively more
nationalist toward treaties, while the Netherlands has the reverse configuration. Russia, finally, is internationalist with regard to both. The tables represent obvious simplifications:
islative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (norms against

legislative entrenchment may prevent efficiency-enhancing legislation).
51. The Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Illinois is
currently gathering data on these and other issues concerning the content
of formal constitutional texts. Less than 20% of 295 constitutions coded so
far, including most current constitutions, mention treaty exit at all. For
more information on the project, see https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/zelkins/constitutions/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2006)

52. See alsoJackson, supra note 8 (identifying nine issues, including negotiation, signing, accepting the treaty, determining validity, implementation,
direct applicability, invocability, status of the treaty vis-A-vis domestic law, and
ongoing administration of the treaty).
53. See Hollis, supra note 37.
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they ignore complexities related to federalist systems, in which
sub-federal units may have their own treaty making powers and
have distinct treatment of customary international law. The
tables also treat all subjects of international law together,
whereas actual constitutional schemes may differentiate
among types of treaties, with only certain subjects requiring
legislative assent. 54 Nevertheless, as rough approximations,
the tables demonstrate the diversity in state constitutional
practice. The countries are arrayed from what might be characterized as the most nationalist regime among the four (the
United States) to the least nationalist (Russia).
FIGURE

1:

DESIGN CHOICES AND DOMESTIC CONFIGURATIONS

United States
Internationalist

Intermediate

Nationalist

Status of CIL?

Superior

Equivalent

Inferior

CIL Directly
Applicable?

Incorporation

Incorporated at
55
founding only

Transformation

Status of Treaties
v. Legislation?

Superior

Lter-in-time

Inferior

rule

Netherlands
Internationalist

Intermediate

Nationalist

Status of CIL?

Superior

Equivalent

Inferior

CIL Directly
Applicable?

Incorporation

Incorporated at
founding only

Transformation

Status of Treaties
v. Legislation?

Superior

Later-in-time
rule

Inferior

Germany
Internationalist

Intermediate

Nationalist

Status of CIL?

Superior

Equivalent

Inferior

CIL Directly
Applicable?

Incorporation

Incorporated at
founding only

Transformation

Status of Treaties
v. Legislation?

Superior

Later-in-time
rule

Inferior

54. For a useful table describing variation in this regard, see id. at 33.
55. Note that we accept arguendo, for purposes of this table, the position
taken by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith about the role of customary
international law in the domestic U.S. order. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra
note 28, at 822.
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Russia
Internationalist

Nationalist

Intermediate

Status of CIL?

Superior

Equivalent

Inferior

CIL Directly

Incorporation

Incorporated at

Transformation

founding only

_

Applicable?

Status of Treaties
v. Legislation?

III.

Superior

How

Later-in-time
rule

Inferior

INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN AFFECT THE
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDER

A. Precommitment Theory
Why might these issues of constitutional design vary
across countries? I draw on the literature that treats constitu56
tions as mechanisms for making political precommitments.
A precommitment means "becoming committed, bound or obligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on future action . . . to influence someone else's
choices." 57 Imagine a constitution written by a single political
leader, seeking to establish legitimate authority. The politician can promise to behave in particular ways, for example,
not to interfere with the rights of his or her citizens. But there
is no reason for citizens to believe mere promises from their
leader. A promise at Time 1 only has value if the promisee
believes that it will be obeyed at Time 2. The politician thus
faces the problem of making the promise credible. This problem is particularly acute when the politician cannot predict the
56. SeeJON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALrIY 88-111 (1979); Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, supra note 11, at 195; HOLMES, supra note 11, at 134-77; JoN ELSTER,
ULYSSES

UNBOUND: STUDIES

IN RATIONALITY,

PRECOMMITMENT,

AND

CON-

STRAINTS 129-41, 157-61 (2000). But seeJEREMV WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 257-60 (1999); Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM 271, 271-99 (LARRY ALEXANDER ED., 1998). See discus-

sion in Ran Hirschl, The Political Originsof the New Constitutionalism,11 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 71, 77-78 (2004). See generally Symposium: Precommitment
Theory in Bioethics and ConstitutionalLaw, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1729 (2003). Note

that commitment and precommitment are utilized interchangeably in these
treatments. See William E. Forbath, The Politics of ConstitutionalDesign: Obduracy and Amendability-A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REv 1965,
1966 n.4 (2003).
57. THOMAS SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT 1 (2006).
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incentives he or she will face in the future. 58 If costs and benefits vary in unpredictable ways, the politician's promise to behave in the specified way may be less believable. To paraphrase Stephen Holmes, why should people believe their
leader when sober, knowing that sometimes leaders can be59
come drunk and behave quite differently?
Facing this problem, a rational constitutional designer
might realize that it makes sense to limit her own power, in
order to obtain the consent of those she governs. Democratic
constitutions can help to serve this role. As Sunstein has written: "Democratic constitutions operate as 'precommitment
strategies' in which nations, aware of problems that are likely
to arise, take steps to ensure that those problems will not arise
or that they will produce minimal damage if they do." 60 Constitutions help make the promises credible by imposing costs
on those who violate promises. 6 1 By tying their own hands,
politicians actually can enhance their own authority.
There are myriad ways that constitutions can play this
role. Elster elaborates how constitutional provisions function
to constrain politicians, but also to restrain the power of the
people. 62 For example, in the American context, the existence of a bicameral legislature and an executive veto makes
legislation more difficult to enact. This can be seen as a device
58. Seegenerally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. RocE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION:

DOMESTIC

UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS

IN

INTERNATIONAL

RELA-

(1997).
59. Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, supra note 11, at
195; see also HOLMES, supra note 11, at 134-77.
60. CASS SUNSTEIN, WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 241 (2001); see also F.A.
HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 179 (1960) ("[The reason for consti-

TIONS

tutions] is that all men in the pursuit of immediate aims are apt-or, because of the limitation of their intellect, in fact bound-to violate rules of
conduct which they would nevertheless wish to see generally observed. Because of the restricted capacity of our minds, our immediate purposes will
always loom large, and we will tend to sacrifice long-term advantages to

them.") and discussion in A.C. Pritchard and Todd Zywicki, FindingThe Constitution: An Economic Analysis of Tradition'sRole in ConstitutionalInterpretation,
77 N.C.L. REV. 409, 447-49 (1999).
61. Oliver Williamson, Credible Commitments-UsingHostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The PoliticalFoundationsof Secure Markets, 149J. INST. THEO.
ECON. 286 (1993); Barry Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and
the Rule of Law, 91 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 245 (1997).
62. GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN &JOHN

ELSTER, CHOICE OVER TIME

35 (1992).
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to restrain the "passions" of the people, who might otherwise
63
act through legislative majorities in unwise ways. Article V is
another feature of the United States Constitution that has
64 More
been analyzed as resolving a commitment problem.
broadly, scholars have long noted that independent courts
and thus reform a means for politicians to entrench policies
65
commitments.
credible
of
problems
solve
There is no single generic constitutional design which
solves the problem of credible commitments because demands
for precommitment vary across countries. Designers worried
about the "passions" of the majority will tie the hands of the
majority by making legislation difficult to enact and subjecting
it to judicial scrutiny. Designers worried about long-term economic stability may constitutionalize an independent central
bank. 66 Designers that face national security threats may seek
to make certain rights non-derogable in emergency situations,
63. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 48, 49 (James Madison).
64. Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism:
Fixed Rules and Some Implicationsfor Contested PresidentialElections, 81 TEX. L.
REV. 1985, 1998-99 (2003); DonaldJ. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting
the Constitution:An Economic Analysis of the ConstitutionalAmendment Process,62
FORDHAM LJ. 111 (1993); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and
Constitutionalism,81 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (2003); Cooter, supra note 5; Mueller,
supra note 5.
65. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciay in
an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); see alsoJ. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A ComparativeApproach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994) (developing a competing electoral explanation); ToM
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS

AsIAN CASES (2003) (describing the insurance model); Keith Whittington,
"Interpose Your Friendly Hand": Political Supportsfor the Exercise ofJudicialReview
by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 583, 584 (2005)
(describing the entrenchment thesis as current political majorities seeking
to insulate policies from future majorities).
66. Politicians fear that were they to have unbridled power to adjust
monetary policy, they would pursue expansionary policies to secure short
term political gains. Recognizing that their short term preferences may diverge from their long term preferences, politicians can establish an independent central bank that can pursue a long term policy insulated from political
control. See also William Bernhard, A PoliticalExplanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence, 92 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 311 (1998); SYLVIA MAXFIELD,
IN

GATEKEEPERS OF GROWTH: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL BANKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

(1997); RobertJ. Barro & David B.

Gordon, Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, 12 J.
MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983);James E. Alt, Comparative PoliticalEconomy: Credibility, Accountability and Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE Dis-
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so as to limit the temptations of military government.6 7 Designers may set up a variety of independent regulatory commissions to place specific tasks beyond the reach of normal politics. 68

B.

InternationalLaw as Precommitment

To the extent that international law binds states and limits
the options of policymakers, it can serve as a precommitment
device. One way to do this is for constitutional designers to
incorporate specific policies and international instruments
into the constitutional text.6 9 But they can also seek to structure the mechanisms of precommitment available to later politicians. By creating rules that facilitate or hinder international
agreements, constitutional designers are designing a structure
for future precommitments by leaders selected through consti70
tutional mechanisms.
Explicit characterization of international law as a precommitment device remains infrequent but is gaining currency
within the growing body of interdisciplinary scholarship linking international law and international relations. 71 Most literature to date focuses on how precommitment works among
states that are each presumed to have a single exogenously defined national interest. Precommitment allows states to signal
147, 152-53 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (summarizing empirical evidence).
67. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113YALE L.J. 1029, 106674 (2004).
68. Our data indicate that human rights commissions and electoral commissions are the most common variants of these bodies, and that their popularity is increasing over time.
69. See, e.g., CONST. ARG. art. 75.22 (American Declaration of the Rights
CIPLINE

and Duties of Man; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; American Convention on Human Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN

pmbl. (Charter of the United Nations

Of 1945; Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981).
70. One might characterize of these constitutional provisions as metacommitments, that is rules structuring the commitment process.
71. Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and InternationalLaw: Starting
a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2055 (2003); Kenneth Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421
(2000); see also Kumm, Democratic Constitutionalism,supra note 7; Kumm, Legitimacy of InternationalLaw, supra note 7; Setear, supra note 7.
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72
to other states that they are serious about their promises.
Certainly not all international agreements among states are
precommitments, in the sense of giving up future choices to
guard against preference shifts. 73 States have many other reasons for entering into agreements, including providing information and expressing "cheap talk" in which they seek to induce behavioral change by others without cost to themselves.
But some kinds of agreements certainly act as precommitments.
Imagine, for example, a foreign investor interested in investing capital into a developing country. The government
may promise not to expropriate the capital, but even if the
investor believes the sincerity of the promise, the time delay
between the promise and the performance creates a problem.74 The current government may not last as long as the
period needed to recoup the investment. Bilateral investment
treaties resolve this problem by making the government promise enforceable through international arbitration. The treaty
75
regime makes the government's commitment more credible.

72. See John A. Robertson, "Payingthe Alligator": Precommitment in Law,
Bioethics, and Constitutions,81 TEX. L. REv. 1729, 1743-44 (2003) (comparing
precommitments to contracts and states to individuals); Andrew T. Guzman,
Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA.J. INT'L L. 639, 680-81 (1998) (suggesting states sign
treaties protecting foreign investments to attract investment by assuring they
will honor their agreements).
73. Ratner, supra note 71, at 2070-72.
74. Technically, a dynamic inconsistency problem.
75. Tom Ginsburg, InternationalSubstitutesfor Domestic Institutions:Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L RIv. L. AND ECON. 107, 122
(2005); Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competingfor Capital: The Diffusion of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 1959-2000 (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 578961, 2004), available at www.wcfia.harvard.
Papers%20Revised/Competing.
edu/conferences/internationaldiffusion/
pdf.). For empirical studies of BITs see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer
Tobin, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing
Countries: The Impact of BilateralInvestment Treaties, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 293, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract-id=557121; Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD
0 0 62 7
;
DEV. 1567-85 (2005), available at http://eprints.Ise.ac.uk/archive/000
EvaluaAn
Work?:
Really
BITs
Do
Sullivan,
Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P.
tion of BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,46 HARv. INT'L L.J.
67 (2005); Guzman, supra note 72, at 680-82.
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In the example above, and in most work to date, the
promise by the government has an exclusively international
audience-in this case the investor-and costs that will be incurred internationally. The argument I wish to focus on is that
sometimes international commitment can also work to resolve
problems for domestic governance. If we relax the conventional
modeling assumption of a monadic state, we can see how international agreements can resolve domestic commitment
problems.
Domestic commitment differs from the conventional international story in that it does not necessarily involve a signal
of private information by the politician. When a politician
makes an international promise to other states, she may try to
communicate a serious intent to abide by the promise. The
seriousness of the politician is something other states usually
cannot observe directly, so undertaking politically costly behavior such as asking parliament to ratify the agreement can
communicate information to other states about the probability
of compliance. By expending scarce political capital, the politician may raise the cost of defection and convince other states
that she is serious about fulfilling the promise.
The domestic political function of international promises
does not necessarily require communication of information,
but can rely simply on the increased costs associated with violations of international promises. The next section discusses the
ways in which international promises affect the domestic environment.
C.

How InternationalLaw Resolves Domestic
Commitment Problems

All politicians face problems committing to their
promises. In democracies, electoral institutions ensure that
the politician will eventually be out of power. Even in an autocracy, however, the risk of coup, revolution or democratization is always present, and supporters of any dictator will discount her promises by the probability of her losing power,
however remote that probability may be. We should thus see
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promises will be kept
some demand for devices to ensure that
76
autocracies.
and
democracies
in both
Domestic legislation is one means of entrenching policies
beyond the life (or the whim) of current political leaders. A
difficult legislative process means that the legislation will be
relatively difficult to overturn in future periods. A relatively
easy process, by contrast, will mean that legislation is of less
value in situations of electoral uncertainty, because a future
politician can easily undo today's policies.
One can think of international law as helping to solve do77
mestic commitment problems. A party that is unsure that it
will remain in power in the future may wish to entrench its
policies in the form of treaties. Since undoing international
agreements is typically costly, a policy that is entrenched internationally may survive the demise of the current political coalition or even regime. 78 This increases the value of the commitment made to one's supporters at the time of the promise.
International commitment devices work in three different
ways. 79 First, international commitments can generate information on the behavior of politicians in future periods. This is
relevant when the behavior in question is difficult for the domestic constituents to observe. A politician that promises to
undertake a particular course of action can enhance the value
of his promise by utilizing international monitors, beyond the
& RocKE, supra note 58, and Brewster, supra note 14, at
511-12 (both focusing on elections as the primary source of uncertainty).
77. Voigt and Salzberger provide one of the few attempts to think
through tradeoffs in delegation to international and domestic institutions.
Stefan Voigt & Eli Salzberger, Choosing Not to Choose: 1Wen PoliticiansChoose to
DelegatePowers, 55 KvKLos 289-310 (2002). In later work, Voigt and co-authors
find support for some of these hypotheses. See, e.g, Stefan Voigt, Michael
Ebeling & Lorenz Blume, Improving Credibility by DelegatingJudicial Competence-the Case of theJudicialCommittee of the Privy Council, Discussion Papers in
Economics 67/04, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics (2004), http:/
67
00
4- .html; Stefan Voigt, Membership Has
/ideas.repec.org/p/kas/wpaper/2
Its Privileges-On the Effects of Delegating Powers Internationally,Discussion Papers in Economics 73/05, University of Kassel, Institute of Economics
(2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
739125.
78. For a similar observation focused on the tensions with democratic
theory, see Daintith, supra note 8.
79. Compare Pritchard, supra note 60, on the precommitment and agency
roles of constitutions.

76. Cf

DowNs
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reach of any domestic politician, to generate neutral and valuable information on performance.
Second, politicians can in effect bond their behavior by
making sure that any future violation of the promise will generate costs from international actors. A government promise
to submit to international arbitration for investment disputes
means that the government may have to pay compensation if it
violates its promises. Here, it is the simple cost associated with
violation, rather than information generated from abroad,
that renders the mechanism useful for enhancing commitment.
Third, politicians can make a credible commitment by
delegating the decision-making authority to an independent
international actor. In this mode, the politician guards against
her future preference shifts by completely ceding decisionmaking authority. Let us consider each of these mechanisms
in turn.
1.

GeneratingInformationfor Domestic Groups
The first modality of international commitment is information generation. Making an international commitment can
generate information for domestic actors that might otherwise
be unavailable to them. International organizations, foreign
states, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have,
under certain circumstances, an incentive to monitor the performance of the state.80 It is well understood that information
produced by international organizations and other states can
help third states decide how to treat the state in question.8 1
But the information can also be useful for domestic constituencies. Voters can learn about the nonperformance of their
leaders. 8 2 Domestic interest groups can determine whether
politicians are delivering on promises to act on the international plane. This information can reduce or eliminate the
agency problem for voters and interest groups, and thus be
80. On NGOs, see Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. (forthcoming Dec. 2006); MARGARET KECK &
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVoCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
81. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY (First Princeton Classic 2005) (1984).

82. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why
Democracies Cooperate More: Electrical Control and InternationalTrade Agreements,
56 INT'L ORG. 477, 479 (2002); Brewster, supra note 14, at 15-17.
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advantageous to political leaders seeking their support ex
ante.

83

Take for example a state that joins the International
Whaling Commission, in part to satisfy a domestic environmentalist movement. 84 The International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling establishes a scientific monitoring body
and provides information on the whale population and harvests. This information is useful to states, but also may be useful to domestic anti-whaling interest groups who can pressure
their state (and others) to comply with the regime's require86
ments. 85 Another example comes from the trade law field.
Trade policy, with its multi-sectoral tradeoffs and package
structure, may be particularly vulnerable to cycling problems.
Cycling would occur when groups seek to re-open negotiations
so as to secure a better deal for themselves, and no particular
87
solution is likely to be stable in repeated pairwise voting. Domestic interest groups may therefore wish to lock-in whatever
bargain they are able to obtain, and to entrench the agreement, protecting their gains from future renegotiation. The
effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an
institution, including both its dispute resolution provisions
and the broader role it plays in providing information, helps
to let interest groups know if their own government is upholding the agreement. This88can help them direct lobbying efforts
to maintain the course.
This information modality works through enhancing the
possibility of domestic punishment of a politician who violates
his or her promise. The actual cost is incurred domestically,
83. Milner, supra note 82, at 503-05.
84. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, art. X(4),
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, as amended Nov. 19, 1956, 10
U.S.T. 952.
85. KECK & SIKKNK, supra note 80.
86. Mansfield et al., supra note 82.
87. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d. ed. 1963) (providing five assumptions that cannot all coexist with
rational decisionmaking). See also Francesco Parisi, Sources of Law and the
Institutional Design of Lawmaking 5-6 (George Mason Univ. L. & Econ. Workat http://www.gmu.edu/
ing Paper Series, Paper No. 00-42, 2000), available
4
departments/law/faculty/papers/docs/00- 2.pdf.
88. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge:
Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environmental Matters, 25 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 84 (2001).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 729 2005-2006

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 38:707

but the international obligation makes that cost more likely by
providing incentives to generate and transmit information.8 9
The key factor is the interaction of the domestic and international levels of governance, which generates different modalities of enforcement than would be possible at either level on
its own.
2.

Obligationfor InternationalEnforcement

International law can also increase directly the cost of
noncompliance with an obligation. In general, obligations are
enforced on the international plane in at least four different
ways. 90 For some categories of obligation, particularly involving coordination problems, international obligations can be
self-enforcing in that neither party has an incentive to deviate. 9 1 In other situations, parties to an agreement can enforce
the agreement directly through retaliation. This mechanism
works in repeated play games, iterated over time, as in the paradigmatic prisoners' dilemma example. 9 2 Obligations can also
be enforced through reputational sanctions enforced by third
parties.9 3 Finally, and relatively rarely, violations can lead to
direct financial or material sanctions. 94 For our purposes, the
main point is that violations of international obligations are,
under some circumstances, accompanied by some cost at the
89. One can characterize this as a solution whereby principals-the voters and interest groups in a domestic political environment-are able to reduce their agency costs. For more on principal-agent models, see ERIc A.
POSNER, CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 225 (2000) (discussing
principal-agent model); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (applying principal-agent model to the administrative state); Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and Strategic
Design of Administrative Process andJudicialReview, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 36162 (1997) (applying principal-agent model to judicial review).
90. Robert Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing InternationalAgreements

and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 551, 580-81 (2004).
91. Tom Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy; An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1229,
1237 (2004).

92.

KEOHANE,

supra note 81; ROBERT AXELROD,

THE EVOLUTION OF

COOP-

(1984).
93. Scott & Stephan, supra note 90, at 590-93.
94. Id. at 570-72.

ERATION
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international level. 95 In turn, this can reduce the incentives
for violating the promise, and make the promise more effective for domestic groups.
As an illustrative example, consider the minorities regimes that were an important class of treaties in Europe between World War I and World War 11.96 The end of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires led to the creation of
many new states in Eastern Europe. But this created a new set
of problems, in that national ethnic groups did not always reside within the borders of the state, nor were any states free of
minorities. Certain states, beginning with Poland and Czechoslovakia, concluded treaties with various outside powers promising to protect minority rights within their jurisdictions. 9 7 In
these treaties, the state promised to ensure protection and a
certain degree of self-determination for ethnic minorities
within its territories. 98 These were important antecedents for
the flowering of human rights law after World War II. 99
How did the minorities regimes work? The conventional
understanding of these treaties is that the audience for them
was primarily international. By concluding the agreement
with powerful outside countries,, the states in question posted
a reputational bond for their positive treatment of minori-

95. Note that I am not asserting or assuming perfect compliance with
international obligations, or that all violations of international obligations
will lead to costs. So long as there is some positive probability of an international cost, the function of enhancing commitment can be effective.
96. Discussed in HENKIN, supranote 17, at 169-70; See also Fred Morrison,
Between a Rock and HardPlace, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 35-38 (2005);John R.
Valentine, Toward a Definition of National Minority, 32 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 445, 450-51 (2004); JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES
TREATIES A FAILURE? 3-4 (1943); L.P. MAIR, THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES:
THE WORKING AND SCOPE OF MINORITIES TREATIES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NA-

(1928).
97. Treaty of Poland, June 28, 1919, S. Doc. No. 82 (1919); Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, Sept.
10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 170; see also Declaration Concerning the Protection of Minorities in Albania, Oct. 2, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 173; Treaty of Peace
between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, Trianon, June 4,
1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 187.
98. See Fred Morrison, Between a Rock and Hard Place,80 CHI-KENT L. REV.
31, 35-38 (2005).
99. HENKIN, supra note 17.
TIONS
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ties.10 0 The outside powers would no doubt monitor the new
states' performance and might also sanction a state that violated the terms. A state that mistreated its own ethnic minorities would now suffer reputational harm, and potentially even
suffer international economic or military sanction. The audience for this signal included the voters and governments of
the large international powers, whose support was needed for
the prospective states to come into being.
But it is important to note that the audience for the signal
was also domestic, in other words within the new countries
making the promise. The minorities in question, residing in
the midst of larger groups of others, can hardly have been enthusiastic about the creation of nation-states around them that
were explicitly based on ethnic nationalism of the dominant
group.' 0 ' One might expect them to have resisted a development which made them suddenly a conspicuous "outsider" in
a nationalistic polity of insiders. The new governments
needed to reassure these minorities. To do this, they could
have promised to treat the minorities well in a domestic constitution or piece of legislation, but by making the promise in the
form of an international treaty, the promise had greater credibility. 10 2 This promise, in turn, may have helped the politicians establishing the new nations, because it reduced the
probability that the minorities would resist the new government.10 3 The international promise had domestic ramifications, ultimately reinforcing sovereignty by minimizing internal dissension.
Another example comes from the territorial settlement
between Italy and Austria over the South Tyrol in 1946.104
100. On bonding see Larry E. Ribstein, Cross-Listingand Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/
voll/issl/art7/; Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141 (2003).
101. See Fred Morrison, Between a Rock and HardPlace, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
31, 35-38 (2005).
102. See generallyJohn D. Pevehouse, Democratization, Credible Commitments,
andJoiningInternationalOrganizations,in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES:
THE INTERACTION OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 25 (Daniel
Drezner ed., 2003).
103. See Ratner, supra note 71, at 2065-66 (discussing uti possidetisprinciple
in post-colonial Africa along similar lines).
104. Csaba K Zoltani & Frank Koszorus, Group Rights Defuse Tensions, 20
FLETCHER FORUM OF WoRLD AFF. 133, 137-38 (1996); Elizabeth F. Defeis, Mi-
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This German-speaking region had been transferred from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire to Italy after World War I, and Mussolini's assimilationist policies had created resentment among
the residents. After World War II, Austria and Italy concluded
the Gasperi-Gruber Accord of 1946 that assured equality and
autonomy for the German-speaking population and special
guarantees for cultural and economic development.10 5 Austria
retained the right to complain on behalf of this population
before the United Nations and International Court of Justice,
making Italy's promise to its minority more credible.1 0 6 The
regional autonomy of Trentino-Alto Adige was thus bolstered
by an international agreement, making it more durable than if
by ordinary legislation or even a constituit were secured only
7
tional provision.10
Trade law provides another example. The WTO provides
information, typically generated by national reports and other
nations' complaints, which may be of value to domestic interest groups unsure of their politicians' performance of agreements.1 0 8 But it also has "teeth" in the form of dispute resolution provisions known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). These provisions authorize bilateral retaliation
against violators of the agreement. 10 9 The dispute resolution
process also provides a coordination point that can facilitate
reputational sanctions.1 10 The DSU provides a framework for
increasing the possibility of internationally-generated costs for
violations of the WTO agreements. This means that domestic
interest groups such as exporters who value access to foreign
markets can count on an international sanction against their
own government should it renege on the agreement, raising
nority Protections and BilateralAgreements: An Effective Mechanism, 22 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 291, 292-301 (1999).

105. See Defeis, supra note 104, at 293, 296-99.
106. Id. at 299-300 (noting that Austria did indeed bring a complaint to
the General Assembly in 1960).
107. Siegfried Weissner, The Movement Toward Federalism in Italy: A PolicyOriented Perspective, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 301, 316 n.75 (2002).

108. See Mansfield et al., supra note 82, at 480.
109. Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in InternationalTrade Law, 65 U.
Pirr. L. REV. 763, 777 (2004).

110. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 91; see generally, Richard McAdams,
The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 1049 (developing an

expressive theory of adjudication).
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the value of the promise to keep foreign markets open.11
These examples show that in some cases, one interest group
can entrench policies at the international level to ensure that
the policies survive the fall of the current government or even
regime.
3.

Delegation

The third modality is to completely remove the politician's future ability to influence the policy. This mode relies
not so much on costs to be imposed on domestic government,
but on isolating decisions from the control of those governments.
To the extent that international obligations involve giving
up control to other actors, they reduce domestic accountability and flexibility. For example, after the currency crises of the
1990s Argentina sought to commit itself to stable policies by
tying the peso to the U.S. Dollar. This worked precisely because American monetary policy was unlikely to be made with
Argentina's interests in mind.' 12 Argentina thus committed itself to following uncertain future policies, by definition
outside the control of Argentine citizens.
Committing to a monetary policy made outside one's borders, such as in the Argentine example or in other countries'
signing of agreements with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), is conventionally understood as a way of delegating decision-making to attract international capital. I do not contest
that delegation may primarily be addressed to international
audiences. But the audience for such moves can also be domestic. Argentina's move not only attracted international capital,
it also assured citizens that they need not remove all their assets from the country. 11 3 Delegation made the commitment
credible in a way that a simple domestic promise could not.
D.

InternationalLaw's Advantages

As noted above in Section III.A., international obligation
is not the only means of entrenching policies. However, inter111. Brewster, supra note 14, at 516.

112.

THE ARGENTINE CRISIS AT THE

CONSEQUENCES

AND

EXPLANATIONS

TURN

OF THE MILLENNIUM:

CAUSES,

(Flavia Fiorucci & Marcus Klein eds.,

2004).
113. Id.
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national law has significant advantages relative to legislative
supermajorities, an independent judiciary, or specialized independent regulatory agencies. A state can set up an independent judiciary, but legislative majorities can always later intimidate the judges or change their jurisdiction. An independent
judiciary may enhance the value of legislation, but there is
nothing to prevent future majorities from enacting new legislation.11 4 And even independent regulatory commissions can be
bribed, intimidated, or captured by determined majorities.
International legal actors, by contrast, are more difficult
to control. International organizations and courts are beyond
the control of any single country, even the most powerful. Indeed, this is the source of concern about a "democratic deficit" in international institutions, a concern that is quite strong
in the United States. 11 5 The democratic deficit, ironically, may
be a good thing to the extent that it facilitates the entrenchment of democratically enacted policies.
Independent of its reliance on insulated decision-makers,
international commitment may be a better device to entrench
policies simply because it is typically more difficult to implement than ordinary legislation. In the United States, some international agreements may be more difficult to enact than ordinary legislation, but others may not be. Other constitutional
schemes vary in terms of the relative difficulty of legislation
and treaties. Where treaties are easier to enact than legislation, their value as a commitment device would obviously be
reduced. But this seems to be a rare configuration.' 16
114. This is a point not adequately considered in the original Landes &
Posner paper, supra note 65.
115. John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REv. 303,
312-16 (2006). But see Sarah Cleveland, OurInternationalConstitution,31 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1 (2006).

116. Stefan Voigt, The Interplay Between National and International Law:
Its Economic Effects Drawing on Four New Indicators (2005) (unpublished
working paper, University of Kassel, on file with New York UniversityJournal
of International Law and Politics). Note that constitutional amendment
ought also be taken into account in developing an economic model of the
tradeoffs among law-making devices. Even if treaties are more difficult to
entrench than legislation, they will be less reliable as entrenchment devices
where the constitution is easier to amend because amendment can over-ride
treaty commitments. The French experience with the European Union illustrates this story. French courts found several new commitments of the Euro-
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There is another reason international law may provide
more credible commitments than domestic legislation. The
relevant unit of analysis in international law is the state, not
the government. New governments can come into power, but
they are still bound by the principle of pacta sunt servandaand
must perform the obligations entered into by a previous regime.' 1 7 This is true, even if the changes are of momentous
nature. For example, in the Gabcikovo case, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) insisted that states retained obligations
entered into by communist governments operating under a
very different economic system in which the relevant level of
planning was multinational.1 18 Hungary and Czechoslovakia
had concluded an agreement to build a joint dam that made
sense under the socialist system, but was seen as both environmentally and economically unfeasible after the fall of communism. When both Hungary and the Slovak Republic (a successor nation to Czechoslovakia) asserted violations of the agreement, the ICJ had to decide whether the circumstances had
changed so significantly that the states had been released from
their obligations. 119 The ICJ found that the obligation remained even though the economic and environmental ratio20
nales for the planned dam had been utterly transformed.
In this sense, a constitutional design providing for a particular
model of treaty entry will be locked in even against future constitutional change, outlasting the government, the entire regime, and even (as in the Gabcikovo case) the state itself. This
has the effect of strengthening treaty commitments relative to
legislation, and makes international law a powerful form of obligation.

pean Union to be incompatible with the French constitution, which was
promptly amended. Remy-Granger, supra note 24.
117. Brewster, supra note 14, at 13; see also Ratner, supra note 71, at 2061.
118. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 155
(Sept. 25); Eyal Benvenisti, Domestic Politics and InternationalResources: What
Role for InternationalLaw?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 109, 114 n.21
(Michael Byers ed., 2001).
119. See generally Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
120. Id. at 34 (political situation transformed), 64-65 (rejecting argument
that the changed circumstances modified treaty obligations).
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E.

InternationalLaw's Disadvantages

The very qualities that give international law its power to
allow politicians to make credible commitments in the domestic sphere-a decision to give up control-have costs. These
costs come in two forms. First are those rooted in the "persis2
tent uncertainty" that permeates the international arena.' '
Second are agency problems associated with international governance.
First, the international arena is constantly changing. New
states come into being, while old ones die or break up; rising
powers displace erstwhile hegemons; and new technologies
change the relative position of states. The variation in conditions over time means that it is difficult to determine in advance the costs that will be associated with violating an international obligation. Some of these costs depend on other states
voluntarily punishing the violating state through bilateral retaliation or third-party reputational sanctions. These decisions
will be made in accordance with the particular political situation of the potential enforcer at the time of violation, as well as
the relative power of the violator. From the point of view of a
domestic interest group seeking to entrench its policies in international obligations, this reduces the certainty of an externally imposed cost.
Koremenos models the world of treaty making as subject
to a series of exogenous shocks which affect the distribution of
gains from an agreement. 1 22 The shocks are not anticipatable,
are observable only at a cost, and are cumulative. This means
that as time goes on the difference between the initial and anticipated distribution of gains and the actual distribution in
any period can grow quite large. Under these circumstances,
Koremenos argues that states may prefer international agreements that are short in duration so as to allow renegotiation,
particularly when uncertainties abound as to the future distribution of gains. By analogy, a domestic interest group relying
on international commitments to entrench policies faces increasing variance in the prospect of externally imposed costs
(as well as externally generated information and decision-making)-although there is potential for the probability of en121. Barbara Koremenos, ContractingAround International Uncertainty, 99

AM. POL. Sci. REv. 549, 550 (2005).
122. Id.
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forcement to increase as well as to decrease, depending on the
direction of change in the international arena. To the extent
states are risk-averse, however, they will view the dynamic quality of international legal enforcement as a disadvantage.
Second, international obligations sometimes involve delegation to international organizations or actors that are unaccountable to any domestic body. It is sometimes asserted that
a growing array of regulatory and government decisions are
made by "networks" of regulators working across national
boundaries. 123 These networks, or specialized epistemic communities, are given these powers because of their technocratic
expertise in an increasingly complex world. But, even more
than domestic regulators, their insulation from control means
that they are not accountable. 124 This implicates the familiar
problem of principal and agent. National governments, duly
elected by their citizens, may delegate decision-making to networks of bureaucrats, but there is always the risk that the bureaucrats will act in their own collective interest rather than
that of any national government.
These forms of uncertainty cut against international commitment. There is thus a tradeoff between enhanced credibility of commitments through international entrenchment,
which is facilitated by giving up control of policies, and the
risks of agency costs and exogenous change that are inherent
in the international environment. Given that there are disadvantages as well as advantages to international commitments,
we ought not to expect every state to have identical constitutional provisions on international law, nor should we anticipate that patterns will be stable over time. Some periods,
when there is a good deal of change in the international
arena, will be relatively risky for delegation. In contrast, when
international law is stable and enforcement is predictable, the
123. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 347 (2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Govern-

ment Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L.

1041 (2003);

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER

(2000); Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3 (1992); PETER M. I-Hs, SAVING THE
MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERA-

(1990).
124. McGinnis, supra note 115.

TION
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advantages of international commitment increase for domestic
actors.
F.

The Relative Advantages of Custom and Treaty

We have now seen that international commitments have
certain advantages, including insulation of decision-makers
and the fact that commitments will survive changes in government or even state structure. They also have disadvantages:
the insulated decision-makers may be unaccountable, and the
changing nature of the international environment generates
unpredictability. With these in mind, this section considers
the relative advantages of custom and treaty in terms of facilitating international commitments for domestic actors.
Traditional international lawyers tended to view the international system as unitary in character and cooperation as normatively desirable as an end in itself. Viewing "international
obligation" as unitary makes it difficult to understand why it is
that states would differ in terms of their treatment of custom
and treaty. While customary international law and treaty law
are different in structure and character, most scholarship to
date has tended to treat states as having propensities toward
cooperation which may vary by issue area but not by instrument type. 12 5 In practice, however, states tend to vary their
constitutional acceptance of forms of international law by in126
strument, with custom and treaty being treated differently.
1.

Custom

For present purposes we focus on the distinct processes by
which international obligations are formed. Whereas consent
is explicit in treaty commitments, consent can be implicit in
the case of customary international law; states are considered
permanently bound unless they persistently object to an
125. Thomas Ginsburg & Richard McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An
Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv.

1229, 1238 (2004).
126. See e.g., Figure 1, supra; Voigt, supra note 116. In reality, the distinction between CIL and treaties is also overstated. For example, many investment treaties explicitly or implicitly invoke customary international law as
the standard for expropriation. Andrea Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial ofJustice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 809,
891-92 (2005) (discussing United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
and NAFTA).
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emerging rule. Another key distinction between customary international law and treaty law is that CIL is created in a decentralized fashion. States, through official action and opiniojuris,
do create CIL. Undertaking certain forms of action may be
costly-for example refraining from abusing prisoners during
wartime. The costs help distinguish customary obligation
from mere "cheap talk." But the decisions to undertake the
action, and the decisions as to what actions "count," are highly
decentralized. When a sufficient number of states (the precise
number is unclear) have acted in a way to indicate adoption of
the rule, the rule "crystallizes" into CIL and thence binds all
1 27
states that do not persistently object.
These rules are puzzling in a number of ways. 128 In particular, they do not seem to acknowledge the presence of persistent uncertainty that marks the international system.1 29 A
state may at Time 1 be neutral towards a particular rule, and
thus fail to persistently object. Exogenous shocks, however,
can significantly affect the distributional gains from a rule of
CIL. If so, then the state could find itself in a position where a
rule it favored or was neutral towards at Time 1 has significant
costs at Time 2. It will nevertheless be bound by the rule.1 3°
Unlike treaties, which have exit provisions,' 3' CIL commitments cannot be unilaterally denounced after they have become binding. 132 The only way to escape the obligation will be
to convince other states that the rule is ineffective and should
give way to a new rule.
127. See MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

AND

CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(1999);

Kontorovich, supra note 80.
128. See also id.
129. Koremenos, supra note 121.
130. Of course, if enough states find themselves in this position, the rule of
CIL can change. In practice, however, examples of CIL change seem to indicate that strong and powerful states have an inordinate influence on the
process. Thus a state of middling power can not anticipate much future
control over the international legal system. See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving
Customary InternationalLaw, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115, 150 (2005).

131. Heifer, supra note 46, at 1581-82.
132. But see Joost Pauwelyn, How Strongly Should We Enforce International
Law? (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 105, 2006), available at http:/
/papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractjid=894116
(arguing that CIL
obligations are alienable).
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This uncertainty might seem to make CIL a particularly
attractive commitment device. By joining international regimes which impose costs, a state seems to signal a commitment to abide by the obligation even ifit becomes costly to do so in
the future. If Koremenos is correct, this function should be
stronger with CIL obligations, which are of unlimited duration, than with agreements which can be and (as she demonstrates) frequently are limited temporally, and can be ex133
ited.
But the problem is that a state cannot specify the content
of customary international law in the same way that a state can
specify treaty obligations. Custom is vague.1 3 4 The content is
beyond the control of any state. The determination of rules is
quite decentralized, with national court decisions, international organization statements, policy pronouncements, scholarly writings and various other materials being commonly cited
for support of a particular rule proposed by the analyst. The
rules are also adjudicated by myriad bodies, without any centralized mechanism for appeal or control of norm-generation.
The potential benefits of CIL as an entrenchment device are
outweighed by its inability to specify authoritatively the particular policy to be entrenched.
The value of entrenchment may also be reduced because
CIL relies nearly exclusively on the executive branch for its
definition and implementation. 35 Much of the evidence for
133. All this assumes that CIL agreements will be enforced. See Scott &
Stephen, supra note 90.
134. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 50 ("[M]any rules of [CIL] do not provide
precise guidance for their application on the national plane."). Of course,
this might explain why states tolerate it. Since the obligations are not precise, states can shift their positions on the interpretation of particular rules
in different situations, to a certain degree.
135. See also, Julian G. Ku, Structural Conflicts in the Interpretationof Customary InternationalLaw, 45 SANTA CtmAr L. REv. 857, 862-64 (2005) (characterizing the Executive as primary in the U.S. allocation of powers with regard to
CIL). This is likely true notwithstanding the formal position of Article I of
the U.S. Constitution noted supra at note 33. The executive primacy in customary international lawmaking is even more pronounced in parliamentary
systems, in which the government is formed out of the legislature. In these
systems the executive predominates both in reacting to statements of custom, as well as domestic lawmaking. Compare Joanna Harrington, Scrutiny
and Approval: The Role for Westminster-Style Parliaments in Treaty-Making, 55
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121 (2006) (discussing parliamentary systems' adjustments to potential executive dominance).
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state practice and consent to rules of custom comes from statements by the executive. The executive, typically a ministry of
foreign affairs, usually has internal bureaucratic competence
for representing the state abroad and will be the actor best
situated to monitor and respond to proposed new rules of customary international law. While legislation certainly can provide evidence for state practice and opinio juris, generally
speaking the executive is in the best position to monitor and
respond to changing rules of CIL. In addition, the requirement of state practice is heavily weighted toward the executive
branch, for it is national bureaucracies that must ultimately
undertake actions enforcing or failing to enforce any particular rule. 13 6 All of this means that the commitment is within
the control of a single branch, so that as control of that branch
changes, policy may change too easily.
In terms of the modalities through which international
law solves domestic commitment problems, these negative
qualities of custom outweigh its temporal advantage of longterm commitment (or at least commitment of uncertain duration). Because CIL is vague, and its details are worked out in a
diffuse, unpredictable fashion, it has relatively little ability to
generate information for domestic interest groups. 13 7 Because
the enforcement of customary international law is highly decentralized, states face a collective action problem in enforcing norms. State rarely have an incentive to incur the costs of
enforcing a rule of CIL against a violating state, or generating
information for domestic interest groups. 138 CIL's only advantage as a precommitment device is that it essentially delegates
the law-making function to the collectivity of states. Even
here, though, CIL's vagueness renders it ineffective. The
broad range of topics that CIL covers means that no domestic
interest group can be confident that CIL will evolve to cover its
136. My analysis is consistent with Setear, supra note 7.
137. SeeJ. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J.
INT'L L. 449, 517 452 (2000) (517).
138. Of course, if the violation of CIL injures a particular state, that state
will have an incentive to incur the costs of enforcement and publicity. Many
CIL norms, however, concern the treatment of a state's own citizens. No
particular external state has the incentive to take the lead to enforce and
publicize violations of these norms. See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy
Analogy: Modern UniversalJurisdiction'sHollow Foundation,45 HARV. INT'L LJ.
183 (2004).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 742 2005-2006

2006]

LOCKING IN DEMOCRACY

for its
specific area of concern. CIL's weakness bodes poorly
139
usage to resolve domestic commitment problems.
2.

Treaties

In contrast with custom, treaty-making structures have
been regularly modeled as a signal to communicate credibility
of commitment to foreign countries. 140 Because legislatures
have the ability to frustrate implementation of democratic
agreements, other states may not believe the executive branch
without legislative acquiescence to treaties. Legislative involvement in treaty making communicates information to other
states as to which type of agreements will be enforced by the
state and which will not. They are thus commitment-enhancing.
This implies a tradeoff. Countries with more difficult
treaty-making processes will tend to have fewer agreements,
but they will be more credible since the cost of legislative involvement itself communicates information about the
probabilities of compliance. 14 1 Constitutional designers have
to balance cost and commitment, credibility and cooperation.
139. Id.; J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary InternationalLaw, 40 VA.
J. INT'L L. 449, 452 (2000); Samuel Estreicher, Rethinking the Binding Effect of
Customary InternationalLaw, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 5 (2003).
140. Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, InternationalPoliticalEconomy: Global
and Domestic Interactions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118,

124 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002); see Lisa Martin, The
United States and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices
(January 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (showing the
choice between executive agreements and treaties is a signal of intention to
comply); Setear, supra note 39; see also Helen V. Milner, The Interaction of
Domestic and InternationalPolitics: The Anglo-American Oil Negotiations and the
International Civil Aviation Negotiations, 1943-1947, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLO-

207, 217 (Peter B.
Evans et al. eds., 1993) (shifting an oil accord from an executive agreement
to a treaty subject to Senate ratification prevented the ultimate acceptance of
the accord).
141. See generally Brewster, supra note 14, at 539-542 (arguing that the domestic structure of international agreements will determine their propensity
and type though structure alone will not be dispositive; demand factors such
as the need for commitment and the difficulty of the treaty process must also
be taken into account). See also HENKIN, supra note 34, at 175 ("Because they
took treaties and international obligations seriously, the Framers were not
eager for the United States to conclude treaties lightly or widely, and were
disposed to render it difficult to make them.").
MACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS
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Two-level game theory has long been used to analyze the
treaty negotiation process. 142 This theory models the interaction between domestic and international bargaining. One
branch of the theory, initially suggested by Thomas Schelling,
suggests that domestic constraint can be used by international
negotiators to secure advantages. 143 By having their hands
credibly tied by domestic interests, authorities working on the
international plane may be able to secure a better bargain
than they otherwise would. 14 4 Of course, having one's hands
tied too tightly can prevent any deal from happening at all. 14 5
Much of the empirical evidence, drawn from trade bargaining,
is not consistent with the Schelling conjecture, 146 but this may
be in part because the models do not always address the possibility that too much domestic constraint can hinder agreement altogether, so that the relationship between domestic
constraint and international advantage is non-monotonic.
This is the tension at the heart of these models. There is
an optimal level of cost for international agreements-not so

high as to make valuable agreements difficult to reach, but
high enough to communicate to other states the seriousness of
the obligation. The precise balance between costliness and
flexibility will depend on a variety of factors, discussed in the
next section. But there is no universally proper balance, and
states will have different optimal schemes.
Brewster considers the objection that treaties may not be
effective entrenchment devices because they can be exited. 14 7
She notes, though, that treaties are relatively entrenched.
Sometimes treaties are interlinked with other agreements, a
142. Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 IrNr'L ORG. 427, 451 (1988). Note two-level game theory has usually focused on pre-agreement negotiations. We widen the scope of two-level
game theory to consider the optimal constitutional design to facilitate good
agreements. One can think about this as three-level game theory: in addition to the level of ordinary domestic politcs, there is an additional dimension of temporally removed constitutional politics choosing to structure the
standard two-level game.
143. THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28-29 (1980).
144. See id.; Putnam, supra note 142, at 451.
145. Frieden & Martin, supra note 140, at 124.
146. Robert Pahre, Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and
Parliamentay Oversight of the European Union, 41 J. CONFL. RES. 147 (1997)
(summarizing literature); see also Frieden & Martin, supra note 140, at 125.
147. Brewster, supra note 14, at 518-19.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 744 2005-2006

LOCKING IN DEMOCRACY

2006]

feature that makes withdrawal from any one more difficult.
Treaties also embed multiple commitments into a single instrument, binding the various substantive provisions together.
In some constitutional schemes (though not the American),
exiting a treaty requires the explicit consent of the legislature
or other bodies that acceded to the treaties. In the analysis
that follows, we make the assumption that exiting treaty obligations is costly. Indeed, if pursued to its conclusion, the objection that treaties are easily exited raises the question as to why
states would enter into them in the first place. I assume that
treaties are entrenchment devices and that exit is indeed
costly. But this is not to deny that some treaty obligations can
be exited relatively easily in some circumstances.
3.

Treaty v. Custom

With regard to the modalities of information, enforcement and delegation discussed in Part III.C., treaties have significant advantages over custom.

1 48

Treaties can tailor the in-

formation-generating mechanisms to address the precise
needs of domestic interest groups. The complex law of treaty
reservations allows states to tailor even multilateral obligations
to a great degree. 1 49 Furthermore, treaty regimes identify specific counter-parties, who therefore have an incentive to enforce the norms either directly, or through reciprocity or reputation. 150 This is quite a contrast with CIL, the enforcement of
148. Of course, the precise distinction between treaty and custom used in
this article is overstated. Sometimes treaties will serve as evidence of custom,
and some treaties will incorporate customary international law into the
treaty. They are complements as well as substitutes. For ease of explication,
however, we consider the choice between treaty and custom to be a binary
one. See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary InternationalLaw: A
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.143, 161-163

(2001).
149. Edward T. Swaine, Reserving 31 YALEJ. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=700981; see
also Laurence T. Helfer, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design, 31 YALEJ. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=894123.
150. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modem and TraditionalCustomary InternationalLaw, 40 VA INT'L L. 639,
659 (2000). SeeJ. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of CustomaryInternationalLaw, 40
VA. INT'L L. 449, 530-532 (2000) (discussing implications of decentralized
CIL enforcement).
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which is decentralized and therefore potentially subject to a
collective action problem for states. When a state violates a
CIL norm concerning the treatment of its own citizens, no
state has much incentive to take the lead on enforcement, or
even identifying the violation.' 5 ' Treaties also can provide
clear, bounded delegation of particular decisions. The plasticity and vagueness of CIL obligations, though not infinite, suggest that states will prefer treaty obligations. Figure 2 summarizes the relative qualities of custom and treaty in terms of the
three modalities of enhancing commitments discussed in Section III.C.
FIGURE

2:

FUNCTIONS OF ENHANCING COMMITMENT

Information

International

Provision

Enforcement

Decisions

Delegation of

Custom

Collective action
problem for
identifying
violations-low

Varies but always
decentralized so
violations not
directed at a
particular state will
likely go
unpunished

Easy-but no clear
decision-maker

Treaty

Mechanisms can
be tailoredpotentially high

Varies but
potentially high
through
reciprocity,
reputation

Easy-can identify
and tailor the
decision-maker

As the table indicates, treaty obligations dominate custom
along all three dimensions of enhancing commitment. CIL is
worse at providing information and norm-enforcement because states are subject to collective action problems. Delegation of decision-making is easy in the sense that states give up
complete control of norm-production when they accept a CIL
obligation, but the lack of an identified decision-maker to ar151. To be sure, one can identify some of the same problems with the
broad international human rights conventions, such as the International
Covenants for Civil and Political Rights and for Economic and Social Rights.
Nevertheless, there is at least the possibility of concluding human rights treaties with specific counter-parties, as the earlier discussion of the Minorities
Regimes and the Gasperi-Gruber treaty showed. See Defeis, supra note 104;
Valentine, supra note 96; Zoltani, supra note 104.
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ticulate norms makes it inferior to treaties, where the scope
and scale of delegation can be precisely designed.
The only other rationalist analysis of the choice between
152
In comparing
treaty and custom is that of Professor Setear.
which he
cooperation,
international
of
theories
two rationalist
perspecchoice
public
the
and
perspective
iterative
the
labels
different
of
choice
branch
executive
the
analyzes
tive, Setear
instruments of international cooperation in the United
States. 15 3 Professor Setear accurately points out that CIL is primarily determined by the executive branch in the United
States and elsewhere. The Executive makes policy statements,
takes positions at international gatherings, and conducts other
actions that will count for state practice and expressions of
opinio juris. Setear then asserts that public choice theory suggests that Executives should prefer customary international
law because the Executive has more or less sole control of CIL.
Control means that the Executive will be able to extract more
rents from interest groups, relative to treaties, which require
sharing rents with the legislature.
This argument fails to consider that the value of the rents
generated may systematically differ between treaty and custom.
As Setear acknowledges, CIL may be a less effective form of lawmaking because it is fuzzy, has an unclear temporal aspect,
and does not have authoritative means for determining applicable rules. 154 This means that any actor seeking to "sell" CIL
rules to interest groups will face a discounted price for those
rules. A rational Executive considering whether to use custom
or treaty will maximize rents. Even though treaty rents must
be shared with a legislature, the benefits in precision and predicted enforcement may be well worth favoring that instrument when compared with vague customs whose formation is
primarily controlled by the executive.
A commitment perspective supports this interpretation.
Because treaties are costly, they would be worth more to interest groups than a customary international law obligation, even
15 5
Treaties are also
if precision of obligation were identical.
152. Setear, supra note 7.
153. Id. at 730-36.
154. See id. at 737.
155. One further piece of evidence for the commitment perspective is the
fact that the United States executive generally seems to prefer the simpler

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 747 2005-2006

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 38:707

more likely to be enforced, as the preceding analysis demonstrates. A more costly treaty process may be worth more to
interest groups than a simple treaty process, and certainly
more than a CIL process, which is likely to be dominated by
"cheap talk."
IV.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

This article has suggested that greater attention needs to
be paid to domestic constitutional and political structures as
determinants of international legal behavior. To be sure, a
number of authors have made similar claims in recent years,
typically those associated with the "liberal" school of international law/international relations scholarship. 156 Few, however, have actually tested the implications of this claim. This
section develops some hypotheses and presents preliminary
empirical evidence in support of the theory outlined here. A
more thorough empirical analysis will be published in a companion paper.
We begin with the assumption of a single constitutional
designer considering three issues discussed at the outset of this
article: (1) whether to make customary international law directly applicable in the domestic legal order (for simplicity, we
set aside the issue of superiority); (2) how difficult to make the
treaty process; and (3) whether to make treaties superior to
domestic law. We assume that any international obligation
comes with some positive probability of some form of international enforcement, either in the form of generating information for domestic groups or a sanction, reputational or otherwise, imposed at the international level. The probability of
other states expending resources in this manner increases
monotonically with the perceived level of commitment of the
executive agreement format over the more difficult formal treaty process.
However, U.S. agreements with democracies are more likely to take the
more costly treaty form. Presumably democratic counter-parties require assurance of the seriousness of the state's commitment, which the more formal
process provides. LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE 40-41 (1984) (providing evidence).
156. E.g., Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in InternationalAgreements, 99
Am. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005); Slaughter, supra note 6. See generally Brewster,
supra note 14, at 502; Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal
Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513 (1997).
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state in question. We assume that the domestic judiciary will
enforce international legal norms in the manner the constitutional designer provides for.1 57 A final assumption is that
there are certain public goods for domestic actors, such as access to foreign markets and international security, which can
only be obtained at the international level. This means that
states have a positive incentive to facilitate international commitments, although states may vary in their relative demand
for commitments.
Each decision involves a choice about commitment structure. As described in the previous section, monist incorporation of CIL into domestic law has serious defects, because both
the content of norms and the expected costs of violation are
quite variable in a changing international environment. We
should expect this device to be utilized only when there are
particular kinds of public goods that can only be obtained
from the CIL form of international commitment, for which
substitute mechanisms are insufficient.
Optimal difficulty of treaty commitment processes requires a balancing of the need for credibility of commitments
with the need for an effective process to secure public goods at
the international level. 158 If treaty commitments are too easy
to enter into, they may not facilitate effective policy entrenchment for domestic interests. Neither do they facilitate credible
signals on the international plane. Therefore a rational constitutional designer will want to facilitate some level of difficulty
for international commitments. The level of commitment
(which involves the issue of superiority of treaty obligations)
will vary with demand for credibility on the international
plane.

157. See Eric George Reeves, United.States v. Javino: Reconsidenng the Relationship of Customaiy InternationalLaw to Domestic Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
877, 877-90 (1993) (discussing incorporation of international law into domestic law in the US); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Deep Anxieties: Australia and
the International Legal Order, 25 SYDNEY L. REv. 423 (2003) (discussing conflicts in Australia between international and domestic laws).
158. Note this calls into question the assumption, common in the international law literature and expressed in Figure 1, that easier processes of commitment are ipso facto more internationalist. A state with difficult processes
of commitment may in fact be more internationalist because its commitments
are more credible, sincere, and more difficult to escape.
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Let us now consider two dimensions on which states vary:
state power and regime type. Each will plausibly have effects
on the design choices discussed here.
A.

State Power

Other things being equal, we should expect that large and
powerful states would have greater need for commitment than
smaller and weaker states. This is true for several reasons.
First, as Robert Putnam has noted, larger states may be more
self-sufficient and therefore their citizens have a lower opportunity cost of non-agreement. 15 9 That is, a self-sufficient state
with a large internal market is less dependent on international
cooperation for the provision of international public goods
and so need not be concerned with facilitating many international agreements. This means that its leaders can favor a
scheme with few credible agreements over a scheme which facilitates easier agreement. We thus predict that difficulty of
the treaty process will increase with state size and power.
A second reason has to do more directly with the need for
credibility of commitments at the heart of my argument.
Weak states can make international commitments, but they
can also be coerced by more powerful states with which they
make agreements. With the possibility of collateral enforcement, treaty partners of weak states do not need a costly treaty
process to find the promise of performance credible. This
suggests that, other things equal, weaker states will have less
onerous treaty making processes. As state power increases, we
should expect the adoption of more rigorous treaty making
processes.160
B.

Regime Type: Democracy and Autocracy

A wide theoretical and empirical literature suggests that
democracies and autocracies behave differently with regard to
a wide range of international phenomena. Democracies do
159. Putnam, supra note 142, at 443 ("All-purpose support for international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent countries
with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient countries,
like the United States .... ").
160. I am bracketing the interesting problem of foreign interests mobilizing the domestic legislature to secure their advantage in treaty negotiations.
See Spiro, supra note 13.
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not go to war with each other.1 61 They cooperate on trade
agreements more often. 162 Some scholars have even argued
comply with international obligations to a
that democracies
63
greater extent.
Without commitment theory, one would expect democracies to desire simpler processes of international commitments.
If democracies are more internationalist than autocracies, as
liberal theory posits, then one would assume they would seek
to facilitate international engagement. Commitment theory, in
contrast, incorporates the strength of commitment into the
cost of obligation. The empirical implication of commitment
theory is that democracies will tend to involve more bodies in
the treaty making process. 164 This makes their promises more
believable.
65 He
Voigt provides some evidence for this conjecture.
finds that the harder it is to delegate internationally, the more
161. The voluminous literature on the Democratic Peace begins with IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Helen O'Brien trans., Grotius Society Pub-

lications 1927) (1795). See generally RJ. Rummel, DemocraticPeace Bibliography
Version 3.0, http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/BIBLIO.HTML (last visited
March 2, 2006); CHARLES LIPSON, RELIABLE PARTNERS: How DEMOCRACIES
HAVE MADE A SEPARATE PEACE (2003); PAUL HUTH & TODD L. ALLEE, THE
DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND TERRITORIAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(2003). Note that democracies do go to war with autocracies, so cannot be

characterized as generally peaceful.

162. Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, Why
Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,
56 INT'L ORG. 477, 479 (2002); Helfer, supra note 46.
163. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of LiberalStates,
6 EUR. J INT'L L. 503, 508 (1995); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal
States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REN,.
1907 (1992). But see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International
Law, 94 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 240, 252 (2000) (only more likely to comply with international dispute resolution); Beth A. Simmons, International

Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in InternationalMonetary
Affairs, 94 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 819 (2000), cited in Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply?
The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT'L ORG. 363 n.16 (2005) (democracies do not comply more).

164. We might also expect that treaty processes will be more difficult than

legislative processes. Allowing international commitment too easily can undermine the legislative process and overly empower the executive. Voigt's

two measures of international delegation are based on the number of international organizations that the country has joined. See Comment, Resolving
Treaty Termination Disputes, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1189, 1200 (1981)
165. Voigt, supra note 116.
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delegation a state actually makes. This finding is consistent
with the commitment model of treaty obligations. If actual obligation was monotonically responsive only to the difficulty of
the obligation process, we should expect that more difficult
processes would lead to less obligation. Voigt's finding that the
opposite is in fact the case is important and supports the commitment hypothesis: states that desire effective international
cooperation will make cooperation more difficult, yet still cooperate more.
Not all democracies are equally situated: within the category of democracies, certain countries will have greater need
for credibility of commitments. Of particular importance here
are newly democratizing countries. New democracies have little international reputation and thus need more credibility on
the international plane. But they also have greater difficulty
committing to domestic groups. Frequently they are recovering from regimes in which government power was used against
citizens, and citizens are unlikely to believe mere promises that
rights will be protected. There is less of a record on which to
judge whether promises will be kept. Citizens may also believe
that the regime itself is fragile and unlikely to survive. 166
We should thus expect greater demand for commitment
mechanisms of international law, including both customary international law and treaty obligations, in new democratic constitutions than in established democracies.1 67 International
law can lock in the commitments, increasing the prospect of
compliance past the life of the current government or even
regime, in environments of fragile democracy. 168
166. See William Mishler & Richard Rose, PoliticalSupport for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures, 22 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 303,
304 (2001); Jon Pevenhouse, Democracy from the Outside-In? InternationalOrganizations and Democratization,56 INT'L ORG. 515, 522 (2002).
167. Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutionsand Human Rights Treaties,
in POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 200 (Jonathan I. Charney, Donald K. Anton & Mary Ellen O'Connell

eds., 1997) ("Countries that had lived under non-democratic regimes in the

past were especially eager to provide their courts with the legal power not to

give effect to national laws or executive decisions in conflict with the states'
international human rights obligations."); see alsoJackson, supra note 8, at
335 (Eastern Europe).
168. An alternative explanation for why new democracies may be particularly prone to adopting "internationalist" constitutions is that there is a kind
of trend among countries to do so during the late 20th century wave of con-
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C.

Evidence

To summarize the hypotheses, we expect that stronger
states and new democracies will write constitutions that will
have more actors involved in the treaty making process. These
actors need credibility of commitments. In contrast, weaker
states, autocracies and established democracies have less need
for credibility of commitments. We should expect more direct
applicability of CIL in newer democracies, but in general we
predict that states will be less inclined to incorporate CIL than
they will be to provide for treaty commitments, which can be
precisely tailored.
We consider here some preliminary evidence for these
propositions based on a sample of 181 constitutions coded as
part of the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University
of Illinois. 1 69 The sample consists of nearly every current na70
This is the first paper to utilize
tional constitution in force. 1
eventually contain data on
will
which
Project,
data from this
written.
ever
constitution
national
every
We can only consider suggestive evidence on state power;
a more thorough analysis will include a number of control
variables. However, simple correlations suggest that larger
states, as measured by population at the time of constitutional
adoption, are less likely to make treaties superior to domestic
legislation and more likely to involve multiple actors in treaty
approval. 17 1 Simple correlations do not indicate any propenstitutional reforms. On the diffusion of policy ideas and institutions, see
Zachary Elkins & Beth Simmons, On Waves, Clusters and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci 33-51 (2005). A companion empirical paper will test this proposition against the commitment
theory outlined here.
169. See SCHELLING, supra note 57.
170. There are a half dozen current countries not included in the sample
because of difficulties characterizing exactly which documents ought be considered the constitution. These include countries that have no formal written constitution such as Israel, UK, New Zealand, and Saudi Arabia, and
others for whom the precise scope of constitutional text is not fully agreed
upon by scholars (Canada, Sweden). SeeJoseph Jaconelli, Constitutional Review in an Unwritten Constitution, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 627, 627 (1985).
171. The log of population is negatively correlated with a dummy variable
for treaty superiority (-.27) at the 99% confidence level. The log of population is positively correlated with the number of bodies involved in treaty approval (.27) at the 99% confidence level. See SCHELLING, supra note 57.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 753 2005-2006

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 38:707

sity for larger states to make customary international law directly applicable.
Consider next the issue of democracies versus autocracies.
We characterized each constitutional design situation in our
sample as a democratic constitution following a democratic regime (DEM-DEM); an autocratic constitution following an autocratic regime (AUT-AUT); or a transition from autocracy to
democracy (AUT-DEM).172 To make these characterizations

we utilized data from Carles Boix, a University of Chicago political scientist, who uses other generally available data to make
binary characterizations of countries as autocracies or democracies in a large time-series. 173 For each constitution, the
country's autocracy/democracy status was considered for the
five years preceding the constitution and immediately afterwards. If the country was rated a democracy in the year of or
immediately following the promulgation of the constitution,
and had been an autocracy at any time in the five preceding
years, without an intervening constitution, it was considered to
have undergone a transition from autocracy to democracy.
In this paper, we report several different descriptive statistics, leaving more sophisticated empirical analysis for a later
paper. With regard to treaties, we examine whether the constitution mentions treaties at all, provides for constitutional review, and provides for treaty superiority to local legislation.
We also look at the mean number of actors involved in
the treaty process. Our coding scheme breaks down the process into treaty proposal, treaty approval and treaty review for
constitutionality (which we treat as a veto point for treaty
adoption).174 A constitutional configuration in which a president proposes a treaty for approval by two houses of the legislature would be coded 3. If the constitution grants the constitutional court an explicit right to evaluate treaties, that would
add a point. But if only one house of the legislature need approve the president's proposed treaty (as in the United States
process for formal treaties), that would be coded 2. The table
172. There were too few instances of constitutional transitions from democracy to autocracy to include in the analysis. Apparently, democratic reversals are seldom accompanied by a new constitution shortly after transition.
173. CARLES Boix, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2000).
174. On vetoes, see

GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS

(2002).
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below summarizes the data, giving percentage of constitutions
with the relevant characteristic for all columns except the second, which reports the sample mean.
FIGURE 3: DRAFTING SITUATIONS AND TREATIES

Type of
Drafting
Situation
AUT-AUT
(n=71)

AUT-DEM
(n=58)
(n=58)

DEM-DEM
(n=52)
TOTAL
TOTAL
(n=181)

Mean # of
Actors
Involved in
Treaty
Process

Explicit
Constitutional
Review of
Treaties?

Treaties
Superior to
Legislation?

.83 (n=59)

1.90

.21 (n=15)

.14 (n=10)

.93 (n=54)

2.76

.50 (n=29)

.50 (n=29)

.81 (n=42)

1.63

.17 (n=9)

.17 (n=9)

.88 (n=155)

2.11

.28 (n=51)

.27 (n=48)

Mention
Treaties?

Figure 3 demonstrates that what might be called "democratizing constitutions" are more likely to give treaties superior
status and to involve more actors in the treaty process than are
constitutions written in either established democracies or autocracies. This finding is consistent with the idea that new democracies need to provide more credible international and

domestic commitments. New democracies lack both a reputation for cooperation and other mechanisms for obtaining
goods in the international arena. Providing more difficult
treaty processes indicates broad support for any international
agreements. Domestic audiences may also prefer difficult
processes, as this means that treaty processes are relatively entrenched in a context where the government may or may not
last, and democracy itself may be tenuous. While it may be difficult to obtain the broad agreement among domestic actors to
affirm the treaty obligation, the obligation is likely to last, and
in this sense is far superior to domestic legislation. Domestic
legislation, after all, could be easily overturned by the opposition political party if it takes power or discarded if the constitutional regime falls.
The interesting finding that democratizing constitutions
seem more likely to include review of treaties for constitutionality is important in distinguishing the domestic and interna-
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tional audiences. It is domestic audiences, not international
ones, who typically have access to constitutional courts to challenge treaties. While review of treaties makes the commitment
more credible internationally, it also provides limits on the
treaty making power in ways that enhance the value of commitment for domestic actors.
Democratizing constitutions are more likely to mention
customary international law and more likely to be monist with
regard to CIL commitments, as Figure 4 below demonstrates.
Of the authoritarian constitutions that mention customary international law, only four out of fourteen purport to make customary international law directly applicable. 175 In contrast,
sixteen out of fifty-eight (nearly thirty percent) of democratizing constitutions provide for the direct applicability of CIL,
and twenty-two of those constitutions mention CIL. Again,
this is consistent with the demand for both international
and
76
domestic commitment in new democracies.'
FicuRE 4:DRArING SITUATIONS

AND CIL

Type of Drafting

Constitution Mention

CIL Directly

Situation

CIL?

Applicable?

AUT-AUT (n=71)

.20 (n=14)

.06 (n=4)

AUT-DEM (n=58)

.38 (n=22)

.28 (n=16)

DEM-DEM (n=52)

.29 (n=15)

.06 (n=3)

TOTAL

.28 (n=51)

.13 (n=23)

The contrast between constitutional treatment of custom
and treaty is important. The analysis in Part III suggested that
custom had distinct defects as a mechanism to make commitments. This led us to predict that states would systematically
be more reluctant to rely on constitutional acceptance of customary international law than they would the more precise
and flexible instrument of treaties. Eighty-six of all current
constitutions mention treaties, whereas only twenty-eight mention customary international law. In every subset of countries,
175. The three are Kazakhstan, Byelorussia, and Azerbaijan. The others
explicitly require incorporation of international law.
176. Bivariate regressions confirms this analysis. AUTDEM predicts Directly Applicable Customary International Law, with a positive coefficient of
.01, at the 99% confidence level.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
HeinOnline -- 38 N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 756 2005-2006

20061

LOCKING IN DEMOCRACY

treaties are more likely than custom to be mentioned and to
be superior to legislation. This provides support for the analysis in Part III about the flaws of custom as a lawmaking and
commitment device.
V.

CONCLUSION:

LOCKING IN DEMOCRACY

International law provides important sources of commitment for governments in the domestic legal order. The decision as to how to tailor the structure of commitments is made
typically at the stage of constitution drafting. This paper has
introduced some considerations relevant to thinking about
how drafters will act in designing the interface between the
domestic and international legal orders. It has suggested that
designers will consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of international law as a means of locking in policies.
International legal commitments are a particular concern
for new democracies. These regimes face a number of particular challenges. The recent experience of an authoritarian regime, possibly involving human rights violations, renders control of political power much more salient.1 7 7 Like judicial review, independent regulatory institutions and other
commitment devices, international law can help to lock in democracy by tying the hands of future governments. In turn,
this may make domestic interest groups more likely to remain
loyal to the new constitutional order. International law makes
sense in contexts where one distrusts outsiders less than one
distrusts one's own compatriots.
States do not remain new democracies forever. If the
democratic regime survives, norms of trust and reciprocity may
develop such that international law is no longer needed as a
commitment device. International law has a number of disadvantages, including agency problems and the dynamic nature
of international politics. As democratic politics becomes established, these negative features may begin to outweigh the benefits offered in terms of domestic commitment. We might
177. Ratner, supra note 71, at 2072, citing CARLOS SANTiAGO NINO, RADICAL
TRILk 68-69 (1996) (describing the post-junta Argentine President's
plans for ratifications of international human rights treaties); see also Andrew
Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 243-44 (2000) (concluding that newly democratizing states choose to enter treaties to "lock in" human rights).
EVIL ON
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thus expect to see states shift from broadly internationalist
constitutions to more parochial ones.
Indeed, one interpretation of American constitutional discourse is that it has moved away from a broadly monist conception at the time of the founding to a more dualist skepticism
about the role and value of international law. The founders
assumed that international law applied and constrained their
actions. 178 Their modern day successors in government are
hostile to international law179 and academic opinion has
shifted toward a dualist conception.18 0 Professor Pauwelyn has
recently noted a similar dynamic in the European Union. 8 1
The findings of this article have implications for our understanding of international law. Professor Slaughter and her
fellow liberal theorists have made much of the need to unpack
the state and examine the domestic determinants of demand
for and compliance with international law. 18 2 This paper has
proceeded in that spirit. The result suggests a further refinement of liberal theory to take into account the particular
needs of new democracies, which have the greatest incentive
to draw on the norms of international law as means of selfbinding.
Given that those articulating CIL rules often draw on state
practice, that new democracies may have inordinate weight in
producing the underpinnings of new rules in turn means that
the content of CIL may reflect the interests of this particular
subset of democratic states.
178. Cleveland, supra note 115.
179. Diane F. Orentlicher, UnilateralMultilateralism: United States Policy Towards the InternationalCriminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 415, 416 (2004)
(noting "America's deeper-and-growing antipathy toward multilateral institutions"); see also Letter from John Bolton, Under Secretary of State, to Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
180. Bradley, supra note 31.
181. Joost Pauwelyn, Europe, America and the Unity of InternationalLaw 16-23
(Duke Law School Working Paper, Paper No. 101, 2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=893611 (noting how at the
outset treaties concluded by EC had direct effect and supremacy, and that
the position has changed toward a more dualist notion as the European
Union has strengthened).
182. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(W. Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
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A second implication concerns evaluations of compliance.
There is now a vigorous debate on whether and when states
comply with international obligations.1 83 If the analysis of this
paper is correct and international rules function as constraints
on domestic political action, then the emphasis in the literature
on state compliance may not fully take into account the impact
of international legal rules. Evaluations of compliance with international norms need to take into account domestic mechanisms of forcing compliance. 18 4 But they also need to consider that international law can shape intra-state behavior even
without apparent impact on the international plane. By locking in policies, international law can be effective on the domestic level even when it is ignored on the international
plane.

183. See generally William A. Bradford, InternationalLegal Compliance: Survey-

ing the Field, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 495 (2005) (surveying the debate over
whether states comply with international obligations).
184. Dai, supra note 163.
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